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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Halvey,23 the Court emphatically sustained the applicability of the full
faith and credit clause to foreign custody awards. It stressed the
view, however, that subsequent modifications thereof by the court of
the forum, based on changed conditions affecting the child's welfare,
would not necessarily violate the constitutional provision.
24
The court, in the instant case, was constrained to effectuate the
Ohio decree unless changed conditions affecting the welfare of the
child since the date of its rendition obviated its modification.2 5 The
refusal to recognize the decree of a court having in personam juris-
diction over the litigants, in the state of the parties' domicile, was
contrary to the weight of authority.2 6
M
CONFLICT OF LAWS- PUBLIC POLICY- ENFORCING FOREIGN
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE.-Decedent, a resident of Wisconsin,
was fatally injured in an automobile accident in Illinois. Plaintiff
administrator brought an action in Wisconsin predicated upon the
Illinois wrongful death statute.' The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that Wisconsin's own wrongful death act 2 announced a public
policy against the trial of causes based on the death acts of other
states. Plaintiff contended that this construction of the Wisconsin
statute violated the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal
Constitution.3 Held, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court is
the final arbiter, in each case, of competing public policies. Wis-
consin's statutory policy must give way to national policy as expressed
in the "full faith and credit" clause. Hughes v. Fetter, 71 Sup. Ct.
980 (1951).4
The mandate of the "full faith and credit" clause has felt the
effect of a number of important judicial limitations. Ordinarily, a
state is not required to enforce the law of a sister state if it is penal
23 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
24 Since the court rendering the original decree has the power to modify
its decree on the finding of changed conditions, the court of the forum, by
its modification on the same basis, would not be doing anything the original
court could not do.
25 The reason for this rule is made apparent in the light of the possible
harm to the child and to the prestige of Courts of Justice resulting from any
other rule.
26 See notes 7, 8 supra.
I ILL. REV. STAT. c. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1949).
2 This statute, textually similar to many wrongful death acts, concludes:
"Provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state."
Wis. STAT. § 331.03.
3 U. S. CoNsT. Art IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts . . . of every other State."4 Reversing Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N. W. 2d 452 (1950).
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in nature,5 if it is a revenue law,6 if adequate procedural machinery
for enforcement is lacking in the forum,7 or if the law is repugnant to
the public policy of the forum." There has, however, been some dif-
ficulty as to what constitutes a statute repugnant to another state's
policy.9 Many of the cases, going the whole length in favor of state
policy, have proceeded on the assumption that the question is one of
comity, and have ignored the application of the "full faith and credit"
clause, 10 or else have summarily rejected any invocation of it."
Dougherty v. American McKenna Processing Co.,12 the first
important case to seriously consider this aspect of full faith and credit,
held in favor of the forum, and concluded that Illinois' own wrongful
death act 13 provided the expression of public policy which enabled
Illinois to refuse enforcement of a New Jersey statute. Subsequent
decisions, however, have detracted from the broad ruling of the
Dougherty case. Some have denied enforcement on the ground that
5 Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338 (N. Y. 1817).
6 "To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is,
or at any rate should be, beyond the power of the courts .... It may commit
the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its neighbor.
Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning; they affect a state in matters
as vital to its existence as its criminal laws." Hand, J., in Moore v. Mitchell,
30 F. 2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U. S. 18 (1930) ; Wayne County
v. American Steel Export Co., 277 App. Div. 585, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (1st
Dep't 1950); 25 ST. JoHN's L. RFv. 341 (1951). But cf. Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935) (holding that an action may be
maintained in a sister state on a judgment based on a tax claim).
7 See Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 119 Me.
213, 110 AtI. 429, 433 (1920).
8 Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E.
619 (1912) ; Gray v. Blight, 112 F. 2d 696 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S.
704 (1940). Cf. Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F. 2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949).
9 A difference in substantive rights arising under a foreign statute will not
necessarily render the statute against the public policy of the forum. Whitney
v. Penrod, 149 Neb. 636, 32 N. W. 2d 131 (1948) ; in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 201 (1918), Cardozo, J.,
said: "Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance; its presence shows
beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend the local policy. But
its absence does not prove the contrary."
10 Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907); Union Trust Co. v.
Grosman, 245 U. S. 412 (1918).
11 "Such causes of action are enforced as a matter of comity. Neither the
Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution requires their enforcement when contrary to state policy." State
ex ret. Bossung v. District Court of Hennepin County, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W.
589 (1918).12 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619 (1912).
13 "No action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover damages
for a death occurring outside the state." HuR 's ILL. STAT. 1290 (1911). This
section has since been amended and the absolute prohibition therein relaxed.
"Provided . . . that no action shall be brought . . . in this State to recover
damages for a death occurring outside of this State where a right of action
exists under the laws of the place where such death occurred and service
of process ... may be had upon the defendant in such place." ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 70, § 2 (1937), as amended by act approved June 12, 1935.
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the death statute in question was penal.14  Waltz v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. 15 treated the death act of Illinois 16 as a jurisdictional limitation
imposed on the Illinois courts by their legislature.17 The foreign
statute involved in that case was enforced, nevertheless, on the basis
that the limitation did not apply to a federal court sitting within the
forum.18
This trend, which prefers national to state policy, has found
ready support even where the controversy has involved conflicting
state statutes 19 or a wide divergence in substantive rights.20 Justifi-
cation for this subjugation of state policy has been found in the rea-
soning that the particular statutes sought to be enforced in the foreign
forum, do not in fact offend the basic public policy as expressed in
the lex fori. Thus, during the transition from discretionary enforce-
ment to an almost mandatory recognition of foreign substantive rights,
the public policy rule has been circumvented, 21 criticized,2 2 disguised,23
14 Clay v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 201 S. W. 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918),
aff'd, 228 S. W. 1072 (1921) (statute setting $5,000 award for wrongful death
by common carrier held penal and not enforceable in Texas) ; McLay v. Slade,
48 R. I. 357, 138 Atl. 212 (1927) (statute basing award on degree of culpa-
bility held penal). Contra: Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224
N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918). That case involved a Massachusetts statute
which provided that the defendant ". . . shall be liable in damages in the sum
of not less than $500, nor more than $10,000, to be assessed with reference to
: * . culpability. . . ." Cardozo, J., said: "Penal in one sense, the statute
indisputably is. The damages ... are proportioned to the offender's guilt....
But the question is not whether the statute is penal in some sense. The ques-
tion is whether it is penal within the rules of private international' law. A
statute penal in that sense is one that awards a penalty to the state, or to a
member of the public, suing in the interest of the whole community to redress
a public wrong. . . . The purpose must be, not reparation to one aggrieved,
but vindication of the public justice. . . ." Id. at 102, 103, 120 N. E. at 198;
accord, RESTATmEE T, CONFLICT oF LAWS §611, comment d(4) (1934). Cf.
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667, 668 (1892).
'1 65 F. Supp. 913 (N. D. Ill. 1946).
26 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 70, § 2 (1937). See note 13 supra.
17 Considering the problem on a jurisdictional basis would seem to be a
begging of the question, since the right of the state to limit the jurisdiction
of its courts in such matters is embodied in the larger problem of the conflict
between state policy and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.28 Waltz v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 65 F. Supp. 913 (N. D. I1. 1946). The
U. S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion
in Trust Co. of Chicago v. Penn. R. R., 183 F. 2d 640 (1950), relying on
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535 (1949).
19 Richardson v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.
2d 985 (1941).
20 See note 9 supra.
21 Waltz v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 65 F. Supp. 913 (N. D. Ill. 1946).22 Richardson v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P. 2d
985, 992 (1941). "There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement
of duties validly created by the law governing their creation . . . . The desir-
ability of uniform enforcement . . . is especially strong among the States of
the United States. Differences in policy among them are of minor nature,
and for the most part relate to internal affairs." RESTATsMENT, CoNFLICr oF
LAWS § 612, comment c (1934).
23 See note 14 supra.
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and in some cases simply not applied.2 4
The principal case, on cursory examination, appears to be the
final step in the whittling process. However, in view of the reliance
placed on the particular facts involved, 25 it is submitted that this is
but another judicial refusal to apply the public policy rule where
there is no compelling reason to do so. As stated by the court,
".... [Wisconsin] has no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful
death suits in general. To the contrary, a forum is regularly pro-
vided for cases of this nature ... ,, 26 The soundness of this logic
is patent. To prevent undue subjugation of state sovereignty to
national accord, the public policy rule should be kept alive for the
exceptional case that demands its application. But needless applica-
tion of the rule can lead only to the subversion of justice, and, per-
haps, to the abrogation of the rule itself.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE CONTROL OF INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE IN NATURAL GAs.-Appellant embarked upon a program of
direct sales to industrial consumers in Michigan. A contract for
such was negotiated with Ford Motor Co. which already was being
supplied by a Michigan public utility which in turn received its supply
of natural gas from appellant. The sales were admittedly interstate
commerce. The question presented was whether or not the State of
Michigan could order appellant to cease and desist from making such
sales and deliveries until such time as it should first have obtained a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Michigan Pub-
lic Service Commission to perform such services. Held, affirmed.
The sales, though in interstate commerce, were essentially local in
character, and, therefore, in the absence of a federal regulation, sub-
ject to state control. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan
Public Service Comm., 71 Sup. Ct. 777 (1951).
The permissible extent of the states' right to regulate industries
and goods in interstate commerce has long been a perplexing prob-
lem. Nevertheless, certain first principles are clear. The generally
accepted test was first set forth in the famed Cooley case.' There
2 4 Bagley v. Small, 92 N. H. 107, 26 A. 2d 23 (1942) ; Richardson v. Pacific
Power and Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P. 2d 985 (1941).
25 ". . . the present case is not one lacking a close relationship with the
state. For not only were appellant, the decedent and the individual defendant
all residents of Wisconsin when this suit was brought, but also appellant was
appointed administrator and the corporate defendant was created under Wis-
consin laws .... Wisconsin may well be the only jurisdiction in which service
could be had as an original matter on the insurance company defendant."
Hughes v. Fetter, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 983 (1951).
26 Hughes v. Fetter, supra note 25 at 982.
I Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
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